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Abstract— In 2004, W. C. Ku and S. M. Chen proposed an efficient remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards to solve the security problems of Chien 
et al.’s scheme. Recently, Hsu and Yoon et al. pointed out the security 
weaknesses of the Ku and Chen’s scheme Furthermore, Yoon et al. also 
proposed a new efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. 
Yoon et al. also modified the password change phase of Ku and Chen’s scheme. 
This paper analyzes that password change phase of Yoon et al’s modified 
scheme is still insecure.1 
Index Terms— Cryptography, Authentication, Smart cards, Password, 
Security attacks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
password based remote user authentication scheme is  used to check the validity of a 
login request made by a remote user U to gain the access rights on an authentication 
server (AS). In these schemes, the AS and the remote user U share a secret, which is often called as 
password. With the knowledge of this password, the remote user U uses it to create a valid login 
request to the AS.  AS checks the validity of the login request to provide the access rights to the 
user U. Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user 
authentication environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes with smarts 
cards [3] - [4] - [5] - [6] - [12] - [13] - [14] - [18] - [20] - [21] - [24] - [29] have been proposed. 
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Lamport [17] proposed the first well-known remote password authentication scheme using smart 
cards. In Lamport’s scheme, the AS stores a password table at the server to check the validity of 
the login request made by the user. However, high hash overhead and the necessity for password 
resetting decrease the suitability and practical ability of Lamport’s scheme. In addition, the 
Lamport scheme is vulnerable to a small n attack [7]. Since then, many similar schemes [23]-[26] 
have been proposed. They all have a common feature: a verification password table should be 
securely stored in the AS. Actually, this property is a disadvantage for the security point of view. If 
the password table is stolen /removed /modified by the adversary, the AS will be partially or totally 
braked/affected. 
In 2002, Chien–Jan–Tseng [13] introduced an efficient remote user authentication scheme using 
smart cards. In 2004, Ku and Chen [31] pointed out some attacks [7]-[28]-[30] on Chien – Jan and 
Tseng’s scheme. According to Ku and Chen, Chien et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to a reflection 
attack [7] and an insider attack [30]. Ku and Chen claimed that Chien et al.’s scheme is also not 
reparable [28]. In addition, they also proposed an improved scheme to prevent the attacks: 
reflection attack and an insider attack on Chien–Jan–Tseng’s scheme. In the same year, Hsu [10] 
pointed out that the Chien–Jan–Tseng’s scheme is still vulnerable to a parallel session attack and 
Yoon et al. [11] claimed that the password change phase of improved scheme of Chien–Jan–
Tseng’s scheme is still insecure.   
A.  Contributions 
This paper analyzes that the password change phase of Yoon et al.’s scheme is still insecure.  
B. Organization 
Section II reviews the Ku and Chen’s scheme [31]. Section III reviews Hsu [10] and Yoon et 
al.’s comments on Ku and Chen’s scheme .Section IV reviews Yoon et al.’s scheme [11]. Section 
V is about our observations on the security pitfalls in the password change phase of Yoon et al.’s 
scheme. Finally, comes to a conclusion in the section VI. 
II. REVIEW OF KU AND CHEN’S SCHEME 
This section briefly describes Ku and Chen’s scheme [31]. This scheme has four phases: the 
registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All these four 
phases are described below. 
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A. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes the number of 
times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this phase. 
Step.R1:   User U selects a random number b and computes PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his 
identity ID and PWS to the AS through a secure channel. 
Step.R2:  AS computes a secret number R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PWS, where EID = (IDn) and creates 
an entry for the user U in his account database and stores n = 0 for initial registration, 
otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present registration. 
Step.R3:   AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card 
contains the secret number R and a one-way function f. 
Step.R4:   User U enters his random number b into his smart    card. 
B.  Login Phase 
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity 
and the password to gain the access services. The smart card will perform the following operations:  
Step.L1:   Computes C1= R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) and C2 = f (C1 ⊕ TU).   Here TU denotes the current date 
and time of the smart card reader. 
Step.L2:     Sends a login request C = (ID, C2, TU) to the AS. 
C. Verification Phase 
  Assume AS receives the message C at time TS, where TS  is the current date and time at AS. 
Then the AS takes the following actions: 
Step.V1:   If the identity ID and the time TU are not valid, then     AS will rejects this login request. 
Step.V2:  Checks, if C2 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TU), then the AS accepts the login request and 
computes C3 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS). Otherwise, the login request C will be rejected. 
Step.V3:  AS sends the pair TS and C3 to the user U for mutual authentication.  
Step.V4: If the time TS is invalid i.e. TU = TS, then U terminates the session. Otherwise, the user U 
verifies the equation C3 
?
=  f (C1 ⊕ TS) to authenticate AS. 
D. Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new password, say 
PWnew. This phase has the following steps. 
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Step.P1: U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader keys the identity and the password 
and then requests to change the password. Next, U enters a new password PWnew. 
Step.P2: U’s smart cards computes a new secret number Rnew = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) ⊕ f (b ⊕ PWnew) 
and then replaces R with Rnew. 
III. REVIEW OF HSU AND YOON ET AL.’S COMMENT ON THE KU AND CHEN’S SCHEME 
A. Hsu’s Comment 
According to Hsu, Ku and Chen’s scheme is vulnerable to a parallel session attack [10].  The 
intruder Bob intercepts the communication between the AS and user U and then from this 
intercepted information, he makes a valid login request to masquerade as a legal user. The intruder 
Bob applies the following steps for a successful parallel session attack.    
 Intercepts the login request C = (ID, C2, TU) which is sent by a valid user U to AS. 
 Intercepts the response message (C3, TS ), which is sent by AS to he user U.  
 Starts a new session with the AS by sending a fabricated login request Cf = (ID, C3, TS).  
The fabricated login request passes all the requirements for a successful authentication of the 
intruder Bob by the AS, due to the fact that the second part , C3 , of the login request also satisfies 
the verification equation C3 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS ). 
 Finally, AS computes C4 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS) and responses with the message pair (T*S, C4) to 
the user U for mutual authentication, where is the current timestamp of the AS. Thus, the 
intruder intercepts and drops this message  
B. Yoon et al.’s Comment on Ku and Chen’s Scheme 
 According to Yoon et al., the password change phase of Ku and Chen’s scheme is insecure. 
When the smart card was stolen, an authorized user can easily replace the old password by a new 
password of her/his choice. First, the authorized user inters the smart card into the smart card 
reader, enters the identity ID and any password PW*
 
of her/his choice and then requests to change 
the password. Next, the authorized user enters a new password PW*new and then the smart card 
computes a new R*new = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*) ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*new) and then replaces R with R*new, without 
any checking. 
Thus, if the malicious user stole the user U’s smart card once, only for a small time and then 
change the valid password with an arbitrary password PW* , then the registered/ legal user U also 
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will not be able to make a valid login request. The AS will not authenticate a registered user U, 
because C2 ≠  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TU) in the verification phase. 
IV. YOON ET AL.’S SCHEME 
This section briefly describes Yoon et al.’s scheme [11]. This scheme also has four phases: the 
registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All these four 
phases are described below. 
A. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes the number of 
times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this phase. 
 User U selects a random number b and computes PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his 
identity ID and PWS to the AS through a secure channel. 
 AS computes two secret numbers V =  f (EID ⊕ x) and  R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PWS, where EID 
= (IDn) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and stores n = 0 for 
initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present registration. 
 AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains 
two secret numbers V, R and a one-way function f. 
 User U enters her/his random number b into his smart card. 
B. Login Phase 
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity 
and the password to gain access services. The smart card will perform the following operations:  
 Computes C1= R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) and C2 = f (C1 ⊕ TU). Here TU denotes the current date and 
time of the smart card reader. 
 Sends a login request C = (ID, C2, TU) to the AS. 
C. Verification Phase 
  Assume AS receives the message C at time TS , where TS  is the current date and time at AS. 
Then the AS takes the following actions: 
 If the identity ID and the time TU   is invalid i.e. TU =TS, then AS will rejects this login 
request. 
Manoj Kumar: The password change phase change is still insecure 
 
6 
 Checks, if C2 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TU), then the AS accepts the login request and computes C3 
= f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS). Otherwise, the login request C will be rejected. 
 AS sends the pair TS and C3 to the user U for mutual authentication.  
 If the time TS is invalid i.e. TU =TS, then U terminates the session. Otherwise, U verifies the 
equation C3 
?
=  f (C1 ⊕ TS ) to authenticates AS. 
D. Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new one, say PWnew. 
This phase has the following steps. 
 U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys her/his identity and the 
old password PW and then requests to change the password.  
 U’s smart cards computes V* = R ⊕   f (b ⊕ PW). 
 Compare this calculated value V* with the secret value V, which is stored in the smart card 
of the user U. If they are equal, then U can select a new password PWnew, otherwise the 
smart card rejects the password change request. 
 U’s smart cards computes a new secret number Rnew = V*  ⊕ f (b ⊕ PWnew) and then replaces 
R with Rnew. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE OF YOON ET AL.’S SCHEME   
Although, the password change phase of Ku and Chen’s scheme is modified by Yoon et al. [11] 
to remove its security weaknesses. But, we analyze that the modified password phase of Yoon et 
al.’ scheme is still not secure. This section discusses the security weaknesses of the password 
change phase of Yoon et al.’s scheme and proves that the modified phase is still vulnerable to 
security attack.  
A. Security weaknesses in the Password Change Phase against the Outsiders 
Observe the password change phase of Yoon el al.’s scheme, to replace/change the old password 
PW with a new password PWnew, the user/performer should be in possession of the old password 
PW. The following section describes how any outsider /malicious user can recover the password 
PW first and then apply this peace of information to make for the success of her/his attack. 
It is clear that the smart card of a legal user U in Yoon et al.’s scheme contains: the secret value 
V, R,  and a random number b and a public hash function f.  According to Kocher et al. [22] and 
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Messerges et al. [29], for the security point of view, to store the secret information in smart cards is 
not a good practice. On the basis of these assumptions [22]-[29], an antagonist is able to breach the 
secrets V, R and b, which are stored in the smart card of the user and then he will be able to 
perform a password guessing attack to obtain the password. For the success of this attack, by using 
the breached secrets R and b the adversary will perform the following operations:  
• The antagonist intercepts the login request C = (ID, C2, TU) and guesses a 
password PW*. 
• Computes C1*= R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*) = f (ID ⊕ x)* and C2* = f (C1* ⊕ TU). 
•  Checks if C2* ?= C2, then the adversary has correctly guessed the password PW* = 
PW and C1* = C1. Otherwise, the adversary goes to step: 1. 
Once the adversary has correctly obtained C1, instantly, the password PW* corresponding to C1 
will be the correct password and then successfully, he can change the password of the user U. 
Consequently, when the smart card was stolen, the antagonist is able to recover the password PW 
of the user and once the adversary has correctly obtain the password PW, then he will be able to 
destruct anything of his choice. Since our focus and aim is to show that the password change phase 
of Yoon et al.’s scheme, which is shown below that an authorized user ( antagonist) can easily 
replace the old password PW by a new password of her/his choice. For the success, the antagonist 
applies the following actions. 
• Inters the smart card into the smart card reader, enters the identity ID and any 
password PW and then requests to change the password.  
• The smart card of the user computes V* = R ⊕   f (b ⊕ PW) and then compare 
the computed value V* with the stored value V. Obviously, both the value 
will be the same, because the adversary has entered the correct password. In 
this way, the smart card accepts the password change request. 
• Selects a new password PW*new and supplies it to the smart card reader and 
ultimately the smart card computes a new R*new = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) ⊕ f (b ⊕ 
PW*new) and then replaces R with R*new. 
Thus, if the malicious user stole the user U’s smart card she/he will be able to make a destructive 
action of her/his choice. Thus, the adversary is able to change the password with a new password 
of his/his choice. Now the registered/ legal user U also will not be able to make a valid login 
request with her/his valid smart card because now the her/his old password  PW  will not work . 
Manoj Kumar: The password change phase change is still insecure 
 
8 
B. Security weaknesses in the Password Change Phase against the Insider 
This section proves that the password change phase of Yoon et al.’s scheme is not secure against 
an antagonist insider at AS. In Yoon et al.’s scheme, observe the registration phase, the User U 
selects a random number b and computes PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his identity ID and 
PWS to the AS through a secure channel. It means the insider of AS is in possession of the number 
PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) for the legal user U. Again the AS computes two secret numbers V = f (EID ⊕ 
x) and R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PWS, where EID = (IDn). Thus, the insider of AS is also in possession 
of the secret numbers V and R for the legal user U. 
Suppose the user U is using the same password PW continuously, which is supplied by the AS at 
the time of registration, then the insider at AS  will be able to change the password PW  with a new 
password of her/his choice. If the smart card is in possession of an antagonist insider at AS for 
short time, then first, the insider inters the smart card into the smart card reader and can directly 
supply the value V to the smart card reader. Either, he directly supplies V or in place of f (b ⊕ PW), 
he supplies the value PWS without using the hash button.  Next, the antagonist insider enters a new 
password PW*new and then the smart card computes a new Rnew = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*new) 
and then replaces R with Rnew. 
Thus, if the malicious insider stole the user U’s smart card once, only for a small time and then 
he can replace the user’s password forever in such a way that the user U also will not be able to 
make a valid login request with her/his valid smart card because now the her/his old password PW 
will not work properly. 
Thus the Yoon et al.’s password change phase is still insecure and that is under the threat of poor 
reparability.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
This paper analyzed that security weaknesses still exist in the password change phase of 
modified scheme of Yoon et al.’s scheme. The password change phase is still vulnerable to 
security attacks by an outsider as well as an antagonist insider at AS. Thus, the security pitfalls still 
exist in Yoon et al.’s scheme. 
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